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Quick Divorce-A Study
By BAsra HUBBARD POLL=TT*
I
We Approach Our Problem
Brave Sir Knight and Fair Mistress Lady wooed one another in an
ivory tower and were wed in the Little Church On The Cape By The
Sea. Showered with rice and trailed by old shoes and tin cans, they
boarded the Good Sloop Domestic Felicity and set out to sail the sea
of holy matrimony For a period all was smooth sailing and they
enjoyed connubial bliss to the full. Shortly, however, there came a
great storm at sea and the waves of temper, jealousy, selfishness,
cruelty, thoughtlessness and misunderstanding drove them on to the
rocky coast, far away from mid-channel and their ultimate intended
destination, Sailor s Snug Harbor. At times jagged streaks of lightning
would pierce the clouds and illume the Heavens above their ship and
they would catch glimpses of Heavenly exaltation such as Jacob must
have experienced when he saw Angels ascending and descending in
his dream as he slept on the pillow of stone. At other times the huge
waves would open up caverns in the water and they would see yawn-
ing beneath them black bottomless pits of Hell such as even Dante
could not have conceived. At other times the waves would subside
temporarily and they would try to steer the Domestic Felicity off of
the treacherous, rock-bound coast, but close into shore lurked a pirate
ship, Sexual Novelty, manned by a strong-willed crew whose captain
was Unbridled Desire. Our hero and heroine were compelled to skirt
the coast and eventually the inevitable happened-they were wrecked
in the dense, soupy Soho-like fog of indifference and the Good Ship
Domestic Felicity foundered, split asunder, and went down with all
on board.
By great good fortune the unlucky people were washed ashore still
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alive though badly bruised and battered. Each blamed the other for
the loss of the ship. They called one another odious names and even
threw plates. They could endure each other no longer, and resolved
to abandon the voyage to Sailor s Snug Harbor and to obtain a divorce.
Mr. and Mrs. Sir Knight were in reality very decent people and they
had grown up in a time and place when divorce was still considered
somewhat of a stigma. They wanted a divorce without publicity or
scandal. They also wanted a speedy divorce, and haad a sufficiently
large estate that financial cost was no problem. They got out their
copy of Martindale s Legal Directory (for Sir Knight had eaten his
dinners at one of the Inns of Court) and also their well worn copy
of Rand McNally or Ask Mr. Foster or some other American Baedeker,
and said to one another. "Who shall go?" and "Where?" Sir Kmght
prided himself on his chivalry and gallantry and answered, "You shall
go, my darling wife." Then, thumbing, through his directories, he
added: "Florida, Arkansas, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Virgin Islands,
Cuba, Mexico, Paris, I'll pay the money and you go wherever you
please, only hurry" And so we come to our problem-that of quick
divorce, also known as migratory' divorce, exparte2 divorce, and now
rapidly becoming known, in the welter and confusion and hurly-
burly of the various decisions being handed down by the Supreme
Court of the United States, as divisible 3 divorce.
Before we attack the problem of quick divorce it is necessary to
make some observations about divorce in general and to narrow our
field by the gradual process of exclusion and inclusion. Of all the
aspects of the justice problem none is more interesting, more important,
more vital, more rotten, more tragic, more filled with uncertainty, more
fraught with peril, than divorce.
Divorce is rotten4 because it is compounded out of perjury- and
the old bogey man, collusion." Divorce is tragc 7 because it destroys
the sacrosanct triumvirate of mother, home and heaven.8 Mother was
'Walton, International and Migratory Divorces, 21 TLL. L. REv. 435, 2 LAw
AND CONTEL. PROB. 289-400 (Published by Duke University Law School), a sym-
posium on Migratory Divorces.
'Peaslee, Exparte Divorce, 28 HAv. L. Rv. 457.
'Paulsen, Migratory Divorce, 24 IND. L. Jotm. 25 at 46; 62 HAnv. L. REV. 131.
'Waite, Children of Divorce m Minnesota; Between the Millstones, 32 MnN.
L. RFv. 766; See further an article by Reginald Heber Smith in the Atlantic
Monthly for December, 1947.
' Hibschman, "You Do Solemnly Swear!" or That Perjury Problem, 24 J. Cmr.
L. 901.
'An excellent note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New York
Anomaly, 36 COL. L. Rv. 1121.
The National Tragedy of Divorce, 30 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 180.
' Recall the old poem of our school days "There are three words that on the
heart are graven, they are Mother, Home and Heaven."
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pretty well debunked as "Mom" in Philip Wylie s Generation of Vipers,
nevertheless her children desire to look on her as a symbol of perfec-
tion and it hurts them very much to think that she may have been at
fault where Dad was concerned.
It requires no argument to prove that divorce breaks up the family
home and, since marriages are proverbially made in Heaven, divorce
knocks the props out from under that beneficent institution also. And
yet, when the former Mrs. Sir Knight flings her wedding ring into
Reno s flowing waters, or takes one last sun bath under the palms of
Miami Beach, and reckons up the advantages and disadvantages of
her new status as a divorcee, she realizes that the Court's decree is not
a total loss. She may breathe a sigh of relief and look for new fields
to conquer.
It is the fashion to say that divorce is perilous9 and uncertain, but
it is no more perilous and uncertain than the parties desire to make it.
So long as husband and wife sue for divorce, m their mutual domicile
and remain there, no uncertainty whatsoever exists concerning their
rights. The human animal, however, is instinctively litigious and
likes to beat the law and outwit the courts. Hence Sir Knight and
wife will not stay in the mutual domicile and seek a divorce in a
"quickie" jurisdiction. Then it is that trouble begins and multiplies.
Divorce is grounded in the roots of antiquity It was well known
among the ancient Jews and the other races of the Mediterranean.o
Divorce is on the march in the Western World, it is on the wane in
the East."
Divorce is a virus that infects all ranks and grades of society but
it only makes newspaper headlines when it strikes home to the great
and the near-great, or at least the Nouvaux riche. Great historical
personages have been divorced-Julius .Caesar, Henry VIII, Napoleon
Bonaparte. Famous writers are frequently divorced-Elbert Hubbard,
Sinclair Lewis, John Stembeck. Stars of the entertainment world
frequently gain additional publicity by the airing of their marital
failures in the divorce courts-Mary Pickford,i - Rudolf Valentino
(a Paris divorce), Gilda Grey, Joan Crawford, Rita Hayworth, Arlene
Judge, De-Wolf Hopper, Artie Shaw It goes without saying that the
idle rich play the divorce game for sheer ennui and want of something
better to do-Doris Duke, Barbara Hutton, Tommy Manville, the
117 CEo. WASH.. L. REv. 380.
" Rodman, A Brief History of Marriage and Divorce, 23 ORE. L. REv. 249,
an excellent and informative article.
' Berman, Soviet Family Law in the Light of Russian History and Marxist
Theory, 56 YALE L. Jout. 26 at 56. Compare a note in 29 MicH L. Rlv. 256.
' See State v. Moore, 46 Nev. 65, 207 Pac. 75.
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Dodge heirs. Walter Winchell's more or less notorious gossip column
has given the language of our times anew word: Reno-vate.
When James A. Stillman sued his wife Fifi for divorce or "Weedie"
Stokes sued his red haired Southern belle, or when Kip Rhmelander
brought his annulment proceeding against hIs mulatto wife, these
items received columns of publicity in that staidest of all American
newspapers, the New York Times.
Our article is to be streamlined, therefore it will not discuss divorce
in general 13 for that would require volumes; likewise, alimony prob-
lems,14 including the Estmi 5 and Krieger decisions handed down by
the Supreme Court of the United States at the 1947 terms are to be
excluded. Likewise problems involving the custody of children10 are
beyond our ken. It goes without saying that we are concerned only
with divorce in the courts, hence legislativeli divorce will not be
touched upon. By the same token, Marriage' s (that indispensable
prerequisite to divorce), and the shadow boxing and fancy foot work
that lie in the twilight zone between marriage and divorce 9 are also
" A symposium In the Law of Divorce, 28 IowA L. REv. 179, 340. For the
Law of the British Empire on recognition of foreign divorces, see Rodman, Divorce
Recognition -in the British Empire, 23 Oe. L. REv. 158. Note, Legislative Ten-
dencies in Modern Divorce, 7 ConN. L. Q. 132.
" See a symposium on Alimony in 6 Law and Contemporary Problems 183,
320, 24 MICH. L. REV. 849; Determination of Property Rights after Exparte, Di-
vorce, 27 MICH. L. REv. 949; Effect of Foreign Exparte Divorce on Prior Decree
for Separate Maintenance, 39 YALE L. Joun. 587; Foreign Decree As Bar to Suit
For Alimony, 28 ILL. L. REv. 284, a Nevada decree involved. Excellent note, 53
HAv. L. REV. 1180, Alimony After Foreign Decrees of Divorce; Sparacio, Alimony
and the Bigamist; A Comment on Section 1140-A of the New York Civil Practice
Act, 21 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 1, 47 COL. L. REv. 158, and 279 (temporary alimony);
34 VA. L. REv. 218, A Nevada decree involved; 12 COL. L. REV. 638, Is Alimony
a Debt?
" Commented on and discussed in 29 BostoN U. L. REv. 284, 24 N. Y. U. L.
REv. 223, 22 So. CALIF. L. REv. 155, 24 NoTRE DAmm LAWYER, 125, 34 CORNELL
L. Q. 263, 16 U. Cm. L. BEv. 151, 33 MINN. L. REV. 307, 61 HAav. L. REv. 1454.
See also Migratory Divorce, 24 IND., L. jobu. 25. As to problems of dower and
curtesy following a foreign divorce see Wheeler, The Effect of Foreign Divorce
Upon Dower and Curtesy, 25 MICH. L. REv. 487- Harper, Effect of Foreign Di-
vorce Upon Dower and Similar Property Interests, 26 ILL. L. REv. 397.
41 HARv. L. REv. 647, Jurisdiction to Determine the Custody of Children.
See a symposium, "Children of Divorced Parents," 10 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEmS, 697-866; Waite, "Children of Divorce in Minnesota; Between the Mill-
stones, 32 MINN. L. Rtv. 766.
' Simeon E. Baldwin, Legislative Divorces and the Fourteenth Amendment,
27 HAnV. L. REv. 699. Judge Baldwin was one of the most distinguished Amen-
cans of his day, a Governor of Connecticut and a candidate for the Democratic
nomination for the presidency in 1912.
"' See Till Death Do Us Part, 17 VA. L. REv. 415, a very fine article by Her-
bert Barry, 34 VA. L. REv. 570, Christian Marrage. If marriage be excluded from
this article, ergo problems of annulment are excluded. As to annulment, see Kauf-
man, Family Relations and Persons, 1946-1947 Survey of the New York Law, 22
N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 866.
" The gentle reader of inquiring mind should by all means read Llewellyn,
Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 COL. L. REv. 1281 and 33 COL. L. REv. 249. Pro-
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to be excluded. From the foregoing exclusions, we see that we can-
not discuss ground 20 for divorce or defenses 21 to such a suit. Let us
then be on with our problem and first of all we come to
II
The Law of the Quickie States
Sometimes reliable secondary sources as to the law of a particular
jurisdiction are more revealing than the primary statutory sources.
The writer of this article has therefore tried the experiment of obtain-
ing law from the ever active and promotion-minded Chambers of
Commerce in the principal cities m the quickie States. Occasionally,
in default of information from a Chamber of Commerce, it became
necessary to obtain aid from a local member of the Bar of high stand-
ing and reputation, and in one case the aid of a law professor was
utilized. When the writer conceived this idea of attack on the prob-
lem, he thought he was developing something new and novel. He
forgot the old adage that "There is nothing new under the sun."
Imagine the writers surprise, when, upon dipping into the legal
periodical material on divorce, he discovered that the always schol-
arly and enterprising Minnesota Law Review had already used the
Chamber of Commerce method in this very field of exparte divorce.
22
If imitation be the sincerest form of flattery then the Minesota Law
Review should feel flattered. And now in order from the Atlantic to
the Pacific, let us consider the law of the various quickie States.
(A)
Florida
The cities of Miami and Miami Beach in Dade County on the so-
called Gold Coast of Florida are the hub of the divorce industry m
that State. Consequently attention will be focused on Dade County
At this point we are reminded of the minister s words, "While these
retire,'let others come"-that is to say Florida practitioners are invited
to skip this part of the article, albeit they may pick up a few crumbs
of knowledge by reading straight on. The following information is
fessor Llewellyn is one of the nation s leading law teachers and it is regrettable
that le never concluded this thought-provoking article.
'As for example, insanity. See McCurdy, Insanity as a Ground for Annul-
inent or Divorce in English and American Law, 29 VA. L. REv. 771.
"tAs for example, recrimination, see Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent
Spouse, 11 TtLAx L. REv. 377 - an excellent article.
See 17 MNim. L. REv. 638, Our Growing Divorce "Racket" and Its Legal,
Social and Economic Consequences - a very fine note.
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the regular mailing piece sent out by the Miami Chamber of Com-
merce in answer to inquiries about divorces in Florida.
INFORMATION AND HOUSING DEPARTMENT
MIAMI CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
FLORIDA DIVORCE INFORiATION
The divorce laws of Florida are not greatly different from
those of many other States. The State has a high interest in the pre-
servation of the marriage relation, and in any suit, the State is vir-
tually a third party throughout, and even if there is no defense, the
case must be proven by adequate competent testimony just as if it
were hotly contested. Grounds for divorce are impotence, adultery,
cruelty, indulgence in violent and ungovernable temper, habitual in-
temperance, desertion for one year or more, previous marriage not
annulled, etc.' Any number of different grounds may be joined in
the same bill of complaint, which must, of course, be proven by sworn
competent testimony.
In order to obtain a divorce, the complainant must be a
bona fide resident of the State of Florida and reside in the State for
90 days prior to filing of the bill of complaint. The divorce will not
be granted where it is the intent of the party or parties to merely
establish residence in order to comply with the law and plan to leave
for their home upon the entering of the final decree.
There are certain notices, orders and passages of time
that have to take place in any law suit, therefore, no solicitor can or
will predict just when a case will finally be finshed.
The Dade County Circuit Court has a rule prohibiting the entry
of a final decree of divorce in less than fourteen days after the filing
of the bill of complaint. In order to get around this rule and to avoid
publicity "big-shots" such as a judge or a top-flight attorney obtain
the "cooperation" of the defendant wife and take their own suits to
more provincial counties, and thereby obtain one-day24 divorces and
escape all publicity or scandal by having the file sealed.
Just prior to the outbreak of World War II the divorce business
was quite malodorous in Dade County Conditions got so bad that
the Bar Association under the courageous and inspiring leadership of
its then president, Stanley Milledge, now himself a Circuit Judge,
stepped in and compelled one judge who was too easy-going -to be
insulated and isolated from all divorce litigation. At the same time
there sprang up on Miami Beach a most brazen and notorious divorce
"mill" the publicizing of which resulted in the disbarment or suspen-
= "Et cetera" stands for relationship of the parties within the degrees pro-
hibited by law and also the obtaining of a divorce by the defendant from the
complainant in any other state or country, but this last ground was virtually
knocked out by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Williams
I and subsequent Florida decisions.
, Compare, Levin, Repeal of Statutes by Implication As Applied to the "Ten
Day" Divorce in Indiana, 11 IND. L. JouR. 139.
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sion of several attorneys. In tis connection the joke is on the writer-
one of the young lady lawyers suspended had been a. student of the
writer s in a large northern law school.
The Dade County Bar Association has set a minmum fee of
$250.00 for the plaintiff's lawyer in a divorce suit. Nevertheless,
prospective litigants shop around or "chisel", as the saying goes, and
sometimes a divorce can be obtained for considerably less, particularly
from members of the Bar who are not in the lawyers "union" The
filing fee for instituting a divorce suit in Dade County is $12.50.
Prior to the advent of the University of Florida Law Review and
the Miami Law Quarterly, relatively little was written on Florida
divorce law other than by that industrious and talented gentleman,
Mr. Herbert U. Feibelman of the Miami Bar. Since the advent of
these two valuable and much needed periodicals, the writings on the
subject of Florida divorces have improved both in quality and
volume.
2 5
(B)
Arkansas
Information was received from both the Little Rock and the Hot
Springs Chambers of Commerce. The latter sent along tourist
pamphlets giving information relative to hotels, etc..
SYNOPSIS OF ARKANSAS DIVORCE LAWS
CAUSES OF DIvoRcE:
A Chancery Court of the State of Arkansas shall have the
power to dissolve and set aside a marriage contract not only from bed
and board, but from the bonds of matrimony, for the following causes:
1st: Where either party to the contract was, and still is impotent.
But see a most valuable and interesting article by Alfred A. Green, Grounds,
Procedure and Principle Problems in Divorce Cases, 15 FLA. LAw Jouit. 44; also
Malcolm McDermott, Extraterritorial Effect of Divorce Decrees, 15 FLA. L. Joun.
58; Feibelman, A Survey of the Administration of the Divorce Laws of Florida,
20 FLA. L. Jout. 326.
Note, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Florida, 1 FLA. L. REV. 62; Note,
Decrees and Judgments Awarding Custody of Children in Florida, I FLA. L. REV.
360; Note, Divorce: Vacation and Modification of Final Decrees in Florida, 1 FLA.
L. REv. 376; Note, Divorce, Lump Sum Payment of Alimony, 1 F.A. L. REV. 79;
Leo M. and Louise A. Alpert, Custody Incident to Divorce in Florida, 2 MIAMI
L. Q. 32; Note, Divorce, Modification of Custody Decree, 2 Msz .sr L. Q. 184;
Note, Comparative Rectitude, 2 FLA. L. REv. 140; Feibelman, Does Florida Recog-
rze a Foreign Decree of Divorce? 9 FLA. L. Jovtn. 469; See further on this point
of full faith and credit given by Flonda to the divorce decrees of a .sister State,
25 ILL. L. REV. 942 and 19 GEORGETOwN L. JoUR. 209, commenting on Passaili-
que v. Herron (1930) 38 F (2d) 775 and the related case of Herron v. Passailai-
que (1926) 92 Fla. 818, 110 So. 539. The learned writer of the Illinois Law
Review note finds it difficult either to approve or disapprove of the two decisions
involved.
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2nd: Where either party wilfully deserts and absents huiself or her-
self from the other for the space of one year without reasonable
cause.
3rd: Where he or she had a former wife or husband living at the
time of the marriage sought to be set aside.
4th: Where either party shall have been convicted of a felony or
other infamous crime.
5th: Where either party shall be addicted to habitual drunkenness
for the space of one year, or shall be guilty of such cruel and
barbarous treatment as to endanger the life of the other, or
shall offer such indignities to the person of the other as shall
render his or her condition intolerable.
6th: Where either party shall have committeed adultery subsequent
to such mamage.
7th: When the husband and wife have lived apart for three con-
secutive years without cohabiting, the court shall grant an
absolute decree of divorce at the suit of either party.
The Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas has con-
strued the 5th section above as follows: "The indignities to the person
herein referred to need not consist of personal violence. They may
consist of unmerited reproach, rudeness, contempt, studied neglect,
open insult, and many other things, habitually and systematically
pursued, which may, according to the habits of the parties, and their
condition in life, be just as effectually within the statute as personal
violence."
ALLEGATION AND PaOOF"
The Plaintiff, to obtain a divorce, must prove, but need
not allege, in addition to the legal cause of divorce:
ist: A residence in the State of three months, next before the final
judgment granting a divorce in the action, and a residence for
two months next before the commencement of the action.
2nd: That the cause of divorce occurred in Arkansas, or if out of
Arkansas, that it was a legal cause of divorce in Arkansas, the
laws of Arkansas to govern exclusively and independently of
the laws of any other state as to the cause of divorce.
3rd: That the cause of divorce occurred or existed within five years
next before the commencement of the suit.
The following information comes from the Bar Association of
Arkansas:
Dear Mr. Pollitt:
Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of March 10, 1949,
relative to your article on divorces. It is assumed that your inquiry
is directed exclusively toward divorce actions instituted by non-
residents of the State.
Under recent court decisions a non-resident must estab-
lish a bona fide residence in the state of Arkansas for at least Sixty
days prior to the institution of his action. "Bona Fide" has been held
by our court to mean a bona fide intention of making this state the
permanent domicile of the applicant for divorce. The bona fides and
*the permanence must be clearly established by the proof. In most
of the contested actions, the jurisdictional requirement of bona fide
residence proves insurmountable.
The filing cost of a divorce action is $7.70. The service
of summons, if personal service is had on non-resident defendant, is
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determined by the charges made by the Sheriff or process server.
This vanes, of course. If the applicant for divorce is the wife, an
attorney ad litem is not appointed unless service is by publication.
If the applicant is the husband, the court appoints an attorney ad
litem to see that notice is given to the other spouse. The fee is $5.00.
If a warning order is published, the charge is $8.75. All in all, the
average court cost in an un-contested case filed by a non-resident
amounts to $20.00.
The fee charged by the attorneys in Arkansas to secure
a divorce for a non-resident applicant vanes. If the matter is un-
contested it will run from $75.00 to $250.00, providing there is no
substantial property settlement. In case of a contest, the fee is what
the traffic will bear, depending upon all the factors which go into
making up a fee charge.
Trusting that this information is adequate, I am
Yours very truly,
Gerland P. Patton
Secretary.
There is a small amount of legal periodical material on Arkansas
divorces.
' '0
(C)
Wyoming
The following information was received from a Cheyenne attorney-
The Cheyenne Chamber of Commerce has referred to me
your letter of March 15, 1949, about Wyoming divorces. I note that
you are an attorney.
Our statutes require sixty days residence before filing a
case. There are a number of grounds for divorce, but the pnncipal
ground alleged is intolerable indignities, which includes the facts
usually included in mental cruelty or perhaps even incompatability.
Our law requires that the testimony of the plaintiff be corroborated
by the testimony of a witness, this usually may be accomplished by a
special short form of statutory deposition.
In addition, our legislature recently has enacted a statute
providing for the divorce where there has been non-cohabitation for
more than two years. Our supreme court, for all practicable purposes,
held that no corroboration is necessary with respect to this ground.
My minimum charge for a default divorce is $250.00.
The court costs would be less than $15.00.
Yours very truly,
Byron Hurst
See 65 U. S. L. RE . 243, 655, 17 MnN. L. Rv. 664, commenting on Squire
v. Squre (Ark. 1932), 54 S.W (2d) 281, a case that no longer seems important
Arkansas law, i the light of the letter from the Bar Association of Arkansas. The
case does not seem to be such bad law under William I. Lee v. Lee, 3 S.W (2d)
672, commented on in 1 ARK. L. REv. 192-divorce granted because of duress in-
volved in "shot-gun wedding" (there is still plenty of action in those Ozark Hills).
See also 1 VANDERniLT L. REv. 651, commenting on the case in 208 S.W (2d) 22.
This case held the decrees of a woman judge, Ruth F Hale, void and thereby
threatened the validity of many Arkansas divorces. The decision was quickly
over-ruled in 210 S.W (2d) 319-the dissent in which is a classic. 28 CoL. L. REi.
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Wyoming appears to be the quietest of all the quickie States. It has
apparently not created a ripple in the stream of periodical literature.
(D)
Idaho
The following information comes from Professor W J. Brockel-
bank of the College of Law, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho:
Dear Sir:
In answer to your letter of March 10 I am going to try
to put on this one page a summary of the divorce laws of Idaho.
Causes: Adultery, extreme cruelty, wilfull desertion, wil-
full neglect, habitual intemperance, conviction of a felony, permanent
insanity if the spouse has been confined to an insane asylum for at
least 6 years next preceding the commencement of the action and it
appears to the court that the insanity is permanent and incurable,
living separate and apart for a period of 5 years without cohabitation.
Defenses: Collusion, condonation, recrimination or limita-
tion and lapse of time. Limitations are as follows: adultery 2 years
after the act of adultery or its discovery, commission of felony one
year after pardon or termination of the period of sentence, all other
causes on unreasonable lapse of time before the commencement of
the action.
Residence: 6 full weeks. Residence means domicile and
the presumption that the domicile of the wife is the domicile of the
husband does not apply. Evidence of the residence requirements
must be corroborated by the testimony of witnesses other than that
of the defendant.
Alimony, suit money and custody of children all within
the discretion of the court and the court may require security and
may require a receiver to enforce payments. In enforcing payments
of the above resort must first be had to the community property of
the spouses and then to the separate property of the husband but
where the wife has a sufficient separate estate and there is sufficient
community property to give her alimony and proper support then the
court must withhold any allowance from separate property. If the
divorce is for adultery or extreme cruelty the community property may
be assigned as to the court seems just. If the divorce is for any other
cause the community property must be equally divided. If the home-
stead is selected from the community property it may be assigned
as seems just, but if selected from the separate property of one of
the spouses, it must go back to its former owner except for a limited
period to the innocent party.
Fees: Uncontested suits mimmum fees are for those whose
residence is the minmum or close to it, $150.00, and for those of long
505, commenting on Clyburn v. Clyburn, 299 S.W 38. In this case, the court
held that "A showing that the parties could not possibly live together after a long
and honest effort to do so is the proper ground for an absolute divorce." The
Review concludes that " a wise public policy, veering away from the notion
of divorce as a private criminal remedy to a theory which recognizes the problem
as essentially a socialogical one, could do no better than to divorce persons so
situated as those in the instant case."
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residence $100.00. Filing fee in the District Court $12.50 and some
other small fees for process serving, etc.
Very truly yours,
W J. Brockelbank
There have been a couple of articles on Idaho Divorce, 27 but this
writer has had no opportunity to examine them.
(E)
Nevada
This letter was received from the Reno Chamber of Commerce:
Dear Mr. Pollitt:
We have your letter of February 23, and in compliance
with your request, we are enclosing herewith a pamphlet STATUTES
OF NEVADA, which is the only printed matter we have on the
Nevada divorce laws.
Trusting that this'pamphlet will be of some help to you,
and if we can be of further service, do not hesitate to call on us.
Yours very truly,
William Brussard,
Manager
The following letter comes from the president of the Washoe
County Bar Association
"Dear Mr. Pollitt:
Your letter of March 10, addressed to the President of the
Reno Bar Association, has been delivered to me. I am the president
of the Washoe County Bar Association, of which Reno is the County
Seat.
On May 24, 1946, the Washoe County Bar Association
adopted as a reasonable average minmum fee in default or un-
contested divorce actions the sum of $350.00. This is the recom-
mended minmum fee for plaintiffs counsel. The recommended
mimmum fee for defendant's counsel was fixed at $100.00.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for me to state
what the average fee is in divorce cases. Some lawyers charge fees
below the mmnmum recommended fee fixed by the Washoe County
Bar Association, and since there are approximately 150 lawyers in
this county, you can appreciate that it would be impossible to tell
you what the average fee is.
The filing fee for a complaint in a civil action is $30.00;
if publidation of summons is necessary, the cost of publication for a
period of once a week for 30 days is $10.00. The court reporters
fee in an uncontested action runs from $7.50 to $10.00 'and the
clerk s fee for an exemplified copy of a decree is from $2.25 to $2.50
and for a certified copy from $1.25 to $1.50, dependant in each in-
stance upon the number of pages in the decree.
Faithfully yours,
Oliver C. Custer
See Boughton, 17 IDA. S. B. 105; also 17 IDA. S. B. 90.
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There is a huge body of law concerning the validity of Nevada
divorce decrees in other States, but these decisions and articles will be
considered m other parts of this article. There is only a small amount
of legal periodical literature on the internal divorce law of Nevada.2 s
(F)
Virgin Islands
The newest haven for seekers of a quick divorce seems to be the
Virgin Islands. The following information comes from the Chamber
of Commerce at St. Thomas. There may be some significance in the
fact that this literature comes printed rather than merely mimeo-
graphed like that enamating from Florida and Arkansas.
INFORMATION CONCERNING DIVORCE ACTIONS IN THE
VIRGIN ISLANDS
1. The grounds for divorce are as follows:
"(1) Impotence existing at the time of the marriage and con-
tinuing to the commencement of the action; (2) Adultery- (3)
Conviction of felony- (4) wilfull desertion for the period of one
year; (5) cruel and inhuman treatment calculated to impair health
or endanger life; (6) insanity of either spouse occurring after
marnage; (7) habitual gross drunkenness contracted since mar-
riage and continuing for one year prior to the commencement of
the action; (8) incompatibility of temperament."
2. The residence requirement is as follows:
"The nlaintiff therein must be an inhabitant of the district at the
commencement of the action and for six weeks prior thereto."
3. After the residence requirement of six weeks is completed the
plaintiff may file his or her divorce action.
4. Junsdiction of the defendant is thereafter necessary which may
be obtained in either one of three ways: (1) by personal service,
after which the defendant has twenty (20) days in which to
answer if served in the jurisdiction or thirty (30) days if served
outside; (2) by documentary appearance and waiver of the
defendant obtained after the filing of the divorce proceeding or
(3) by publication for six weeks in a local newspaper, the de-
fendant having thirty l30) days thereafter to answer.
5. After the completion of the residence requirement, the filing, and
the service, the matter is heard by the Court, at its next session
of which there are six each year, to wit: January, -March, May,
July, September and November.
14 MiNN. L. REv 94 and 3 So. CALIr. L. REv. 127, both commenting on
Blankenship v. Blankenship, 276 Pac. 9. In this case the doctrine of comparative
rectitude was rejected and the doctrine of recrimination applied. The case is no
longer law in Nevada due to the statutory adoption of the doctrine of comparative
rectitude. 44 HARv. L. REv. 996, commenting on Bates v. Bates, 292 Pac. 298.
In this case the Nevada Supreme Court held that an English decree granting a
wife a judicial separation barred a suit for divorce by the husband in Navada for
causes arising prior to the English decree. The Review does not look upon the
case with favor and it would seem to have little strategic importance today m the
battle between the sexes.
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6. The District Court, although Federal, hears these cases by reason
of its jurisdiction to try cases under the laws of the Virgin Islands.
The divorce proceedings are in accordance with the laws of the
Virgin Islands and the decrees have the same legal effect as
decrees issued in State Courts.
(G)
Cuba, Mexico, Urguay, France
Many Americans go to Cuba and Mexico (particularly the latter)
for a quick divorce and in the past a considerable number of them
have gone to;Paris and perhaps other parts of France. So far as known,
no Americans go to Uruguay, but that country is mentioned because it
is said to be the Reno of Argentina, where there is no divorce.
2 9
Cuba
Cuban divorce law is well and adequately explained in the inter-
esting article by Rolando Millas in 3 Miami Law Quarterly 269. The
reader is referred to that periodical for further information on Cuban
Law
Mexico
The Mexican Divorce is mostly of the "mail-order" variety, that is
to say, neither party actually establishes any residence but each gives
a power of attorney to his or her counsel in the Mexican Court. As
will appear hereinafter in Part V of this article, such divorces are gen-
erally not recognized in American Courts. Most of the discussion of
Mexican divorces from the point of view of residence requirement
and procedure and grounds, has been written in the American Bar
Association Journal. 30
France
About twenty years ago it became the vogue for wealthy estranged
couples living on the Atlantic Sea-board of the United States, to seek
relief from the foundering of the Good Ship Domestic Felicity by
going to Paris for a summer and casting off the chains of matrimony
in the French courts. A scandalous situation developed, a great hue
' See a note in 55 HAuv. L. REv. 1377, Divorce in Matrimonial Domicile Held
Entitled to Recognition in Argentina Where Divorces Not Granted.
'See a note, entitled Quzck Divorce in Sonora, Mexico in 12 A. B. A. Jotm.
379. The leading article appears to be by that recogmzed authority, Lindell T.
Bates, The Divorce of Americans in Mexico, 15 A. B. A. Jowu. 709. Cartwright,
Yucaten Divorces, 18 A. B. A. Jouir. 307. Summers, The Divorce Laws of Mexico,
2 LAw AND CoNTENORARY PROBLEMS, 310 (1935). Walton, International and
Migratory Divorces, 21 ILL. L. REV. 435, beginmng at 450.
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and cry arose,3 ' and less was heard about French Divorces. There is
a book on the subject 32 and several articles.33 The most famous case
of a Paris divorce in the American courts is that of Gould v Gould in
the New York Court of Appeals, discussed in Walton34 and in most
of the articles and notes involving New York law cited in Part V of
tlus article. Under the Petain government the divorce laws of France
were radically altered along Nazi lines. Exactly what the law of France
is at the moment remains (to the writer) a matter of conjecture.
(H)
Divorce Litigation in the Public Press
A scientific experiment in statistics was attempted through the
Florida newspapers. The aid of a clipping bureau was utilized and
all the clippings concerning divorce m the Florida newspapers during
the months of March and April, 1949 were collected. At the outset
the proprietor of the Clipping Service discouraged this experiment by
saying that not enough data would be assembled to establish any con-
clusions. Both the clipping service and the writer were agreeably sur-
prised at the amount of data finally assembled. The experiment ap-
pears to have been worth while, although different minds may draw
different inferences from the data collected.
The writer hesitates to be dogmatic in the drawing of inferences
from the clippings. One fact however, stands out-cruelty m one form
or other is the chief cause of divorce. Why is it that spouses deliber-
ately hurt one another mentally or physically? We also perceive that
liquor, gambling, other men or women, nagging, disputes over money,
and sexaul maladjustments are many times factors in wrecking the
Ship Domestic Felicity Beyond this point the writer declines to
draw inferences.
35
' See 6 N. Y. L REv. 297. (Not read by the writer.)
"Bates, The Divorce and Separation of Aliens in France (1929), reviewed in
7 N. Y. U. L REv. 777- 39 YALE L. Joui. 1282; 25 ILL. L. REv. 348, 16 CORNELL
L. Q. 141, 16 CORNELL L. Q. 444.
Beach, American Divorces in France and Their Validity in United States,
11 A. B. A. JoulR. 26. See also letter from Mr. Beach, entitled Some Further Ob-
servations on French Divorces, 16 A. B. A. Joun. 69.
See further Walton supra, Note 1, at page 448; also the articles on the law
of France in the symposiums cited in Part I of this article.
' Supra, Note 1.
See MARSHALL AND MAY, TiHE DIVoRcE CotmT ni MARYLAND (1932), THE
DIVORCE COURT IN Omo (1938). These books contain valuable court statistics.
They were prepared under the auspices of the ill-fated and short-lived Johns Hop-
kins Institute of Law, the early demise of which was a blow. to legal science.
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III
Results Flowing From Quick Divorce
These results flow from quick divorce:
The policy of society tends to favor divorce-society says if they
cannot live together harmoniously and happily, why not let them have
a divorce.
Society tends to recognize quick divorces as valid.
The policy of the law becomes one of not only encouraging mar-
nage but also one of encouraging divorce. This legal policy is reflected
in several ways-(1) in upholding bills of complaint which are ac-
tually insuffcient under the law in the books; (2) in entering final
decrees on evidence too weak to make out a prima facie case accord-
ing to the law in the books; (3) in judicial opposition to alimony with-
out divorce, some judges considering such a situation a form of black-
mail by the wife.
Law lags behind public opinion.3 6
Domicile becomes a legal fiction. Witness the case of our late
President's daughter who obtained a Nevada divorce and blandly
assumed that she could vote in her former (and true) domicile, to-
tally ignoring the fact that she had claimed Nevada as her domicile.
Oh Innocence, how sweet are thy charms!
A conflict immediately ensues between the law in the books put
out by the courts and the law in action as published by the legislature.
The courts, ostrich-like, insist on domicile, while the legislators intend
that domicile means reszdence.
The so-called social stigma of divorce vanishes into thin air. Thirty
years ago when a distinguished and highly capable Governor of Ohio
was a candidate for the Presidency some slight explanation of his
6 So. CALIF. L. REv. 229 at 233. Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce,
34 MicH. L. REv. 959 at 977" the theory of divorce has "lagged" behind the
practice of the times in an astounding fashion. Daily we have been becoming
more and more divorce conscious, more willing to face the reality of the problem
quite apart from ecclesiastical idealogy.
"Thus divorce, first to the non-participant almost a crime, moves through the
stage of socal outrage, of terrible misfortune, of regrettable necessity (and in the
large, a menace) of a something better not alluded to, of a 'That's too bad-till it
becomes an event not too greatry different from another." (Quoted from Llewellyn,
BEmiND THE LAw OF DivoacE, 33 COL. L. REv. 249 at 294.)
"Divorce theory has not kept pace with the mores and prevalent social prac-
tices of today. Courts have recogmzed that the scheme of divorce machinery is
totally inadequate to meet the needs of current society. Something had to be
done; some protection had to be given the decrees condemned under ecclesiastical
theory. Divorce deals with human relations of a complex character, in regard to
them the law can exercise little deterrent force. Persons will divorce and will
purport to create further family relationships founded on decrees which theory
abhors."
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divorce was vouchsafed to the electorate. Today all this is changed-
witness the case of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., not to mention Anna,
James and Elliott. Also witness the cases of the Governor of Florida
and Senator Cam.
Perjury and collusion3 7 run rampant. These however are ugly
words, so let us substitute for collusion, "co-operation," for perjury,
"belief in a legal fiction."
Quick divorce favors the wealthy It is centered in tourist or re-
sort areas and is therefore accompanied by gambling and extra-marital
relations.
The desire for a new mate is more of a cause of quick divorce, but
is also a nearly inevitable result.
Costs become excessive m the form of attorney s and other fees.
Occasionally the corroding influence of money enters the academic
world and contaminates the very Inns of Court.
In some jurisdictions the "Special Master" racket flourishes like
the green bay tree, despite the best efforts of a few judges and lawyers
to cut it down.
The courts, in view of social and legal policy, make little attempt
to reconcile the sparring partners.
At the same time the judges know in their hearts that the merits
of the exparte divorce before them are not as one-sided as the plain-
tiff's stories would make it appear.
Hypocrisy abounds.38 The moment any defendant, who has not
personally appeared, comes into the jurisdiction and directly attacks
the exparte decree by a Bill in the nature of a Bill of Review, a great
shout of fraud on the court and on the sovereign state goes up, and
in most of such rare instances the divorce is set aside. Compare the
thousands of instances in which the courts have closed their eyes to
such "fraud."
A demand springs up throughout the Nation for uniformity in
divorce legislation39 and for some better basis of jurisdiction than that
of domicile.
40
See a note, 17 CIN. L. REv. 202.
Compare, MAY, SOCIAL CONTROL OF SEX ExPRE SsION, reviewed in 44 HAiv.
L. REv. 1015.
Eaton, Proposed Reforms rn Marriage and Divorce Laws, 4 COL. L. REV.
243. See a valuable note as of the time when it was written, Divorce Legislation,
20 COL. L. REv. 472. Draft of a Uniform Divorce Law, 14 HAnv. L. REv. 525.
Confusion n the Field of Divorce Law, 5 NOTRE DAvm LAWYER 218. Smith, The
Divorce Evil, 7 NOTRE DAIm LAwYER, 515. The Proposed Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act, 19 Miss. L. Jout. 124 (1947 ' public opinion increasingly
recognizes the ills which spnng from this unfortunate situation. The validity of
subsequent marrages, the status of children, titles of property, nghts of inheritance
and many other vital incidents of life are rendered uncertain by the cloud of m-
validity hanging over these 'tounst' decrees." See an excellent note, Enforcement
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Divorce mills come into being. Witness Miami Beach about 1940,
Chattanooga recently Alexandria, Virginia, some years ago.
Divorce becomes free and automatic in fact-1 though not in law
The era of divorce by mutual consent arrives.
IV
Quick Divorce in the Supreme Court of the United States
As every A or B senior in law school knows, Article IV of the Con-
stitution of the United States provides as follows (Section 1) "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Rec-
ords, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Rec-
ords, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
It is due to this clause that the Supreme Court of the United States
is the final arbiter on the validity of exparte divorces. The realm of
interstate divorce has been governed by two Kings, the first of whom
was known as Haddock. 42 We shall now chronicle some of the events
that occurred in his reign.
(a)
The Reign of King Haddock
In 1906 Haddock came to the throne, succeeding King Atherton.4 3
From the beginning of his reign Haddock met with vigorous opposi-
by Estoppel of Divorces Without Domzcile: Toward a Uniform Divorce Recognition
Act, 61 HA~v. L. REv. 326-quoting Mr. Justice Jackson as follows: "Lawyers
don't know what in the world to advise their clients. Clients don't know how to
dispose of their property- or whether they are divorced or not divorced. People-
simple people-have to live by these rules."
4The problem of domicile is discussed under Part IV of ths article.
' Note, Collusve and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly, 36
COL. L. REv. 1121 at 1132: "An outright adoption of the pninciple of divorce by
mutual consent subject to the sound discretion of the court would not be a revolu-
tionary step. Mutual consent divorce has been ofically sanctioned elsewhere, andis today, through collusion, a fact in the United States and England."
Divorce by mutual consent is opposed in an article in 12 FLA. L. Joun. 335,
entitled The Divorce Traffic: It's Cause and Cure. In an article of the same title
in 13 FLA. L. JouR. 13, a different writer supports divorce by mutual consent.
Silving, Divorce Without Fault, 29 IowA L. REv. 527 at 531. "A marriage
originating in the free will of two individual ought to be dissoluble by their con-
sent, commum dissensu. Therein lies the real test of the applicability of the
contract idea to the sphere of marriage. If the analogy to contract law be main-
tained, no other reasons of divorce need be alleged but such consent of the parties.
If mutual consent constitutes a divorce ground the element of fault is inapplicable.
The Swedish law of June 11, 1920 draws that logical conclusion: The spouses may
obtain a divorce by mutual consent without imparting to the judge the reasons
of their decision." Rodman, A Brief History of Marriage and Divorce, 23 OsEON
L. REv. 249, Waite, Children of Divorce mn Minnesota: Between the Millstones,
32 MriN. L. REv. 766 at 773. Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 34 MicH. L.
REv. 749 and 959.
201 U. S. 562, 50 L. Ed. 867, 26 S. St. 525, 5 Ann. Cas. 1.
" 181 U. S. 155, discussed in 1 COL. L. REv. 396.
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tion.44  The most vociferous and certainly the most formidable op-
ponent of King Haddock was a short, rotund, brownie-like man
named "Joey" Beale, who dwelt among the elms at Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and held his own in the lists against all comers in the
famous intellectual tournament, known as Harvard Law School. When
Beale opened fire on King Haddock he almost demolished Haddocks
fort with his initial blast.45 Haddock however was very tough and
resilient and survived despite the deadly accuracy and intensity of
Beale s withering fire.
Haddock had a flair for publicity and encouraged his supporters,
apologists and detractors to argue about him. Many articles were
written concerning the merits and effects of his accession to the
throne.4 0 In time Haddock became more popular and even Beale, his
stoutest antagonist, was inclined to make peace with him on the theory
" See a note in 8 COL. L. REV. 449, entitled Divorce Decrees Under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, " This minority view has recently been adopted by
the Supreme Court of the United States, four justices dissenting, in a case holding
that, where a husband deserted his wife in New York, established a domicile in
Connecticut, and secured a divorce a vinculo on notice by publication only, the
wife not appearing in the suit, this decree was not entitled to full faith and credit
in a suit by the wife in New York for a separation and alimony. Haddock v.
Haddock (1906), 26 Sup. Ct. 525. The majority opimon, while not denying that
a suit for divorce is a proceeding in rem, yet refuse to support the logical result
of this theory on the ground that if state A where one party is domiciled has juris-
diction to grant a divorce, which will necessarily affect the status of the defendant
domiciled in State B, the inherent right of the State B to determine the status of
its citizens is impaired. But it would seem that as great an abridgment of the
rights of both states occurs when neither is allowed to determine finally the status
of a party domiciled within it, which is practically the result of the principal case
In conclusion it is submitted that the case refuses to carry to its logical con-
clusion the accepted theory of divorce, is opposed to the weight of authority in
this country, and is inconsistent with Atherton v. Atherton. It is supportable, if
at all, only on the ground that public policy demands that divorces shall be granted
only where one party is domiciled in the state and the other is therein personally
served with process or voluntarily appears or where the suit is at tle matrimonial
domicil. But these reasons would seem more appropriate for the consideration of
the State legislatures than of the courts, whose regard for them must result in the
abandonment of theory for a hopeless inconsistency in practice."
" Beale, ,Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce, 19 HAiv. L. REv.
586 at 597 " The decision then is opposed to reason, to authority, and to
morality; but it will stand until the question is raised again. As Mr. Justice Holmes
said in his dissenting opinion, civilization will not come to an end meanwhile."
" Some of these articles were good, some bad; some of them were original,
others were merely repetitious; all purported to be learned.
See note, Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees, 18 IowA L. REv. 320. Note
16 VA. L. REv. 706. Parks, Some Problems in Jurisdiction to Divorce, 13 MINN.
L. REv. 525. Note, 17 MINN. L. REv 518. Vreeland, Mr. and Mrs; Haddock, 20
A. B. A. Jour. 568. Note, 6 So. CALIF. L. REv. 229. Bingham, The American
Law Institute, vs. the Supreme Court-In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21
CORNELL L. Q. 893-Professor Bingham attacks Professor Beale. JONES, CONFLICT
OF LAWs IN DIVORCE CASES, 10 NOTRE DAME, 11. Note, 8 Miss. L. Jotn. 897.
Note, 10 NOTRE DAME LAW 76. Note, 14 BOSTON U. L. REv. 826. Strahorn,
A Rationale of the Haddock Case, 82 ILL. L. REv. 796. Strahorn, The Supreme
Court Remsits Haddock, 38 ILL. L. REV 412. Note, 2 CORNELL L. Q. 335.
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that since he had to live with Haddock he might as well live har-
moniously417 Beale seemed to justify Haddock s rule on the theory
of fault in the acquisition of a new domicile and other writers adopted
this theory,48 including the powerful gentlemen who constitute the
American Law Institute and promulgate the Restatements.
4 "
Eventually Haddock was overthrown by Williams I and the Su-
preme Court ordered the old man executed. Many a sentimental tear
was shed over his death and his followers went into "hiding across
the water" like those who supported Bonnie Prince Charlie many years
ago. Suitable and appropriate funeral services were held for the late
kmg? °  The memory, the legend of Haddock still carries on. His
bones have been exhumed and their repository has become a legal
shrine."ai The phrase, out-Hacdocking Haddock, has become part of
our professional terminology 52 Now, like the ghost of Hamlet's
father on the castle wall at Elsinore, Haddock s ghost is beginning to
haunt us.53  Can nothing get us rid 'of the dead king? Or is he like
the old man of the Sea? Surely there must be some way to terminate
his eerie existence even if we have to kill him many tims, as the grand
Duke killed Rasputin, the Mad Monk of Russia, in the movie, Rasputin
and the Empress.
(b)
Under the Flag of Williams
In 1942 Williams I succeeded Haddock on the Throne of Exparte
Divorce. Upon what thoughts did the sorrel-topped Mr. justice
Douglas ruminate as he sat quietly on the Supreme Court Bench,
awaiting his turn on Opinion Day to announce the execution of Had-
- Beale, Haddock Revisited, 39 HA.v. L. REv. 417. Beale, The Conflict of
Laws, 1886-1936. 50 HAnv. L. REv. 887 at 891.
" McClintock, Fault As An Element of Divorce Jurisdiction, 37 YALE L. J. 564.
' See Leflar, Jurisdiction to Grant Divorces, 7 Miss. L. J. 445. Compare another
article by Leflar, More Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees, 4 Mo. L. REv. 268.
See a very fine note entitled Uniformity and the Recognition of Exparte Divorces,
44 YALE L. J. 488.
'Hirsch, In Memoriam, Haddock v. Haddock, 14 PENN. B. A. Q. 232.
5THolt, The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock, 41 MicH. L. Rv. 1013 at 1036:
it would not be fitting to say in the language of the stage that Williams v.
North Carolina has drawn the curtain on Haddock v. Haddock. Rather we will
shift the metaphor, to say that the recent case from North Carolina has largely
stripped the flesh from the earlier decision. Yet the bones of Haddock v. Had-
dock remain-unbleached and unpulverized. Just as persons with mechanical turn
of mind may frame from blocks of wood puzzles of readjustment and resetting,
so courts in states that do not favor free and easy termination of marriage may
still find the osseous remains of the Haddock case material to fashion some puzzle
for the Supreme Court of the United States to solve-puzzles upon which law stu-
dents and their teachers in the meantime may speculate."
' Corwin, Out-Haddocking Haddock, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 341.
' See Paulsen, Migratory Divorce, 24 INp. L. J. 25 at 46.
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dock and the accession of Williams to the Throne? Did he believe
he was at long last vindicating another one of Holmes dissenting
opinions? Or did his thoughts go deeper and did he believe he was
inaugurating a social and legal revolution? The announcement of
the opinion did indeed create a sensation. No more excitement could
have been caused by the tossing of the lighted squib into the market
place in the old English case in which Sir William Blackstone was one
of the judges. The scene rivalled in excitement the throwing of the
bomb in Joseph Conrad's well known novel, The Secret Agent. Un-
doubtedly, as Mr. Justice Douglas delivered his opinion, he thought
he was making the law of divorce more clear, simple and certain.
His opinion however left a loophole, a hole in the dike as it were, and
the waters soon entered under the guise of the opinion in Williams II,
delivered some three years later. The net result of the two Williams
decisions was to leave the law largely what it was under Haddock.
True the watch-word under Haddock was "comity", whereas the
watch-word under Williams is "full Faith and Credit", but the courts
render only lip service to their noble Sovereign and Liege Lord, King
Williams I. It is fashionable for legal writers to set out the facts m
the two Williams decisions in much detail. The cases are so recent
and received so much newspaper publicity that their facts will not
be repeated here. The job has already been well done in several of
the articles and notes referred to in the next footnote. Suffice it to
say that under Williams I and II an exparte divorce decree, rendered
in a quickie State upon constructive service only and meeting the
requirement of procedural due process, is prima facie entitled to full
faith and credit in all other states, and the heavy burden of proof is
cast upon the party who seeks to overthrow the decree, a burden
which can only be satisfied by the production of evidence. Williams
II made clear what Williams I had intimated-that exparte decrees
were only valid if based upon actual, bona fide domicile. Thus the
flood-gates opened once more. There is a vast body of periodical
literature on the Williams cases, the citations in the footnote being
more selective than all-inclusive.
5 4
"Note, 43 COL. L. REv 116. Note, 41 MicH. L. REv. 754. Strahom and
Reiblich, The Haddock Case Overruled-The Future of Interstate Divorce, 7 MD.
L. REv. 29, containing a discussion of the Maryland decisions-a fine article.
Lorenzen (the old master), Haddock v. Haddock Overruled, 52 YALE L. J. 341-
discussing three theones at page 350, which theories he labels as "New York," "In
Personam" and "Residence." Kane, The Williams Case, 12 FoRDHAni-, L. REv. 150.
Holt, The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock, 41 MicH. L. Rxv. 1013. 29 A. B. A.
Joun. 78, A Symposium of Lay Editorial Opinions. Burns, Two Nevada Divorces
Get Full Faith and Credit, 29 A. B. A. Jout. 125. Eldridge, Navada and North
Carolina-A Symposium, 29 A. B. A. Jout. 268. 31 GEORGETowN L. J. 210. Radin,
The Extraterritorial Decree of Divorce, 18 ST. JOHN s L. REV. 29, discussing New
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(c)
In The Province of Domicile
Law must be forever on the march, forever dynamic. If it biv-
ouaces, for more than over-night, it liquefies. If it goes into winter
quarters, it crystallizes. If it retreats, even for strategic purposes, it
ossifies. One good way for law to ossify is for the judges to become
charmed by the repetition of a mellifluous word, such as domicile.
To be sure, the failing is a very human one. There was a time in the
Galsworthy era of Soames Forsyte as London s leading barrister, when
every one was using the word "interesting." Disregarding such ob-
viously bias and slanted words as "Commumst" "Fascist" "Socialist",
"Economic Royalist", "Muck-raker", "Robber Baron" and similar ap-
peals to emotion, one word now commonly popular is "terrific." What
can we do about the word "domicile",5 in the field of Quick Divorce?
At the moment the drift seems to be towards substituting Residence
for Domicile.56 Domicile is looked upon as a fiction.Y In 1948 The
Supreme Court handed down more learning and law on domicile. In
Sherrer v. Sherrer 58 and in the companion case of Coe v Coe59 the
York Law. Lorenzen, Extraterritorial Divorce-Williams v. North Carolina II, 54
YALE L. J. 799. Rodman, Bases of Divorce Jurisdiction, 39 ILL. L. REV. 343.
Bingham, Song of Sixpence, Some Comments on Williams v. North Carolina, 29
CORNELL L. Q. 1. Note, Public Policy and the Recognition of Foreign Divorce
Decrees, 20 NonmE DAME LAw, 486. Excellent note, 31 IowA L. REv. 237, dis-
cussing the concept of domicile. Note, 82 CORNELL L. Q. 417, discussing New
York Law. Lorenzen, The Aftermath of Williams v. North Carolina, 1 MrA \u
L. Q. 1. Husserl, Some Reflections on Williams v. North Carolina II, 32 VA. L.
REv. 555, 980. Corwin, Out-Haddocking Haddock, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 341. Powell,
And Repent At Leisure-An Inquiry Into the Unhappy Lot of Those Whom Ne-
vada Hath Joined Together and North Carolina Hath Put Asunder, 58 HAmv. L.
REV. 930-1017, a veritable book in itself. 17 TEMPLE L. Q. 466. Note, 17
TULANE L. REV. 500. The Citation of Williams v. North Carolina I is 317 U. S.
287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 1273, 1294 (1942). The cita-
tion of Williams II is 325 U. S. 226, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1123, 157 A. L. R.
1866, 1399 (1945).
Beale, Proof of Domicile, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 552, Coudert, Some Considera-
tions in the Law of Domicile, 36 YALE L. J. 949.
1 Note, 26 Mici. L. REv. 438. Excellent note, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 259. Lees-
man, Note, 21 ILL. L. REv. 279. 34 CORNELL L. Q. 263. 62 HA1v. L. REv. 514,
a very good note. 44 ILL. L. REv. 117.
"r Holmes, Justice, dissenting in Haddock v. Haddock, quoted in Frankfurter,
The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 HAuv. L. REv. 683. Compare
the dissenting opimons of Justices Rutledge and Black, in Williams II, summarized
in Lorenzen, Extraterritorial Divorce-Williams v. North Carolina II, 54 YALE L. J.
799 at 800. Holt, Any More Light on Haddock v. Haddock? The Problem of
Domicile in Divorce, 39 Mica. L. REv. 689. The author of the foregoing article
is indeed a prophet not without honor in his own country-he foresaw the over-
ruling of Haddock v. Haddock.
334 U. S. 343, 68 S. Ct. 1087. Discussed in 34 VA. L. REv. 709; 23 ST.
JOHN s L. REv. 139; 34 CORNELL L. Q. 263; 33 MINN. L. REv. 317- 22 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 155; 24 IND. L. J. 25.334 U. S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094. Discussed in 15 BROOKLYN L. REv. 165.
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Court held that a defendant spouse who had appeared and parti-
cipated in the litigation in the quickie State could not thereafter
litigate the issue of domicile in another State, even though the issue
of domicile had not been expressly litigated in the quickie State.
The man from Mars, if trained in realistic jurisprudence, might
deduce the following conclusions from the victory of the Kingdom
of Exparte Divorce in the battle of Sherrer and Coe:
(1) to the watchword of Full Faith and Credit is added a new
watchword, Res Adjudicata or Estoppel.
(2) Feigned issues will be tried m the courts of the quickie States,
marking a return to the great common law action of ejectment.
(3) We now have three kinds of domicile-the prima facie domicile
created by Williams I, the domicile of litigation created by Sherrer
and Coe, the old fasluoned, actual, bona fide, true domicile which
may still be called the matrimonial domicile. The first and second
of these types of domicile fuse and merge into one.
(4) The tendency seems to be towards a more in personain theory
in according Full Faith and Credit to exparte divorces.
(5) The armies of King Williams are on the march and will m
time achieve further victories, assuming that the President (whoever
he may be) does not pack the Court with conservative justices.
(6) The next victory that will come is a decision to the effect that
the issue of domicile cannot be raised in another State after an ap-
pearance by the defendant spouse in a quickie State. This step is
bound to come. All lawyers in the quickie State advise their divorce
clients along these lines.
(7) If we combine the doctrines of Williams I and Sherrer, and
look some years ahead into the future, we can see another develop-
ment: a new rule to the effect that defendant spouses who have only
been constructively served and who have not appeared, are barred
from litigating the issue of domicile in another State, provided they
received actual notice through the constructive service.
(8) After these victories the other States will be forced by the
inexorable logic and course of events to let down their own bars
against easy divorce and quick divorce will become nation-wide.
The latest decision of the Supreme Court adds nothing to the pic-
ture °0 A word might be said m passing about the Estin and Krieger
cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States m 1948 on
the same day as Sherrer and Coe. The Estin case deals with alimony
and is therefore not within the confines of this article. It is not cer-
' See Rice v. Rice, 69 S. Ct. 751, discussed in 44 ILL. L. REv. 117 pnor to
the Supreme Court decision. As to Full Faith and Credit in general see 49 COL.
L. REv. 153.
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tam that the rule of the Estin and Krieger decisions (to the effect
that a support order in the "home" state survives a quickie divorce)
applies to temporary alimony The logical argument is in favor of
letting the quickie divorce kill temporary alimony
We now come in the orderly development of our subject to
V
The Decrees of the Quickie States in the Courts of Sister States
In so far as the 'Supreme Court of the United States requires the
decrees of the quickie States to be accorded Full Faith and Credit,
all other States are bound and no issue arises when a quick divorce
is attacked as invalid in another State. There is a large field in which
Full Faith and Credit is not compulsory and in this field, in which
the States have a free hand, they go merrily on their way, invalidating
quckie decrees.61 Most of the reported decisions discussed in the
legal periodicals involve Nevada or Mexican decrees, but the principle
is the same as to any quickie jurisdiction, except that Full Faith and
Credit only applies within the United States whereas comity governs
the validity of Cuban, Mexican and French divorces.
Nevada divorces have been held valid in New Jersey,6- invalid
in New York,63 Pennsylvania, 64 Illinois, 65 Missouri, 66 valid and invalid
in Virginia,67 invalid in West Virginia, 6 8 Connecticut,69 California,
7 0
Massachusetts, 71 Michigan.
7 -
G'See for example the numerous cases cited in Shepard's Citations under Wil-
liams I, in nearly all of which the quickie divorce was held invalid on the issue of
domicile or fraud on the court.
'Schneider v. Schneider (N. J. Eq., 1928) 142 Ad. 417, discussed in 27
MICH. L. REv. 470. See Vreeland, The Validity of Foreign Divorces, 10 TULANE
L. REV. 416 at 422. Compare note 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. RFv. 185 commenting on Di
Bngida v. Di Bngida, 116 N. J. Eq. 208, 172 Atl. 505 (1934).
'Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. Y. 463, 178 N. E. 680 (1930), discussed in 8
N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 502, also discussed in 30 MICH. L. REv. 285. But see note
86, infra, showmg that the New York Courts have been quick to apply the doc-
tnne of estoppel in order to uphold quickie divorces.
" In re Vetter s Estate, 162 Ad. 303 (Pa. 1932), discussed in 19 VA. L.
REv. 278.
'Janssen v. Janssen, 269 Ill. App. 283 (1938), discussed in 28 ILL. L. REv.
284. Jardine v. Jardine, 9 N. E. (2d) 645 (I1. 1937), discussed in 17 OrExoN
L. REv. 70. Atans v. Atkins, 386 Ill. 345, 54 N. E. (2d) 488 (1944), discussed
in 39 ILL. L. REv. 191.
'Wagoner v. Wagoner, 287 Mo. 567, 229 S.W 1064 (1921), discussed in 30
MICH. L. REv. 285.
"' See an excellent note in 22 VA. L. REv. 288-245. Also another note in 28
VA. L. REv. 563-568.
'Ward v. Ward (W Va. 1984) discussed in 21 VA. L. 1Ev. 237.
'Mills v. Mills, 119 Conn. 612, discussed in 16 BosToN U. L. REv. 915.
'Brill v. Brill, .38 Cal. App. (2d) 741, 102 P. (2d) 584 (1940), discussed
in 10 Foirmm L. REv. 96.
" Cohen v. Cohen, -- Mass. - 64 N. E. (2d) 689 1946), discussed in 41
ILL. L. 1Ev. 128. Also discussed in 30 MIN. L. REv. 399.
-Gray v. Cray, 820 Mich. 49, 30 N.W 2d 426.
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In considering the validity of Mexican divorces, care must be
taken to distinguish between those based upon a semblance of resi-
dence on the part of the plaintiff and those of the pure, unadulterated,
mail-order variety Mexican divorces have been held invalid in
Iowa,73- New York,-4 New Jersey, 75 Massachusetts,"0 valid and invalid
in California,"' invalid in Ohuo, 78 the District of Columbia.7
9
An Arkansas divorce was held invalid in Mississippi, 0 A Wyoming
divorce was held bad in Massachusetts, 8 1 likewise an Idaho divorce.s
Florida divorces were considered invalid in a leading New York case
involving the use of an injunction, 83 valid in New Jersey s' The fore-
going citations are of value only in the light of the dates of their
decisions, that is their date with reference to Haddock v Haddock,
Williams v North Carolina, and Sherrer v Sherrer.
Bonner v. Reandrew, 203 Iowa 1355, 214 N.W 536 (1927), discussed in 13
IowA L. REv 320.
" Alzmann v. Maher, 246 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Add. Div. 2nd Dept. 1930), dis-
cussed in 31 COL. L. REv 892. Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N.E.
819 (1929), modifying 222 App. Div. 460, 226 N. Y. Supp. 576 (1928), discussed
in 43 HA v. L. REv 477. See discussion of Mexican mail-order divorces m 18
N. Y. U. L. Q. 94 at 100. In the latest New York Court of Appeals decision it
was held that Mexican mail-order divorces were absolutely void, so that the doc-
trine of estoppel could not save them under any circumstances, Caldwell v. Cald-
well, -- N. Y. -- 81 N.E. (2d) 60 (1948), discussed in 47 MicH. L. Ray. 574
and 62 HARv. L. Rxv. 131. Compare, In re Fleischer s Estate, 80 N. Y. S. (2d)
543,- discussed in 49 COL. L. REv. 417, wherein the divorce was held good, the
court feeling the influence of Sherrer and Coe. Query- Should an attorney be dis-
barred for getting himself mixed up in a Mexican mail-order divorce? See 49
COL. L. REv. 128, discussing In re Anonymous, An Attorney, 274 App. Div. 89, 80
N. Y. S. (2d) 75 (1st Dept., 1948).
' Reik v. Reik, 158 A 519, 109 N. J. Eq. 615. Compare, "New Jersey doc-
tnne of disinterest," enunciated in Sherman v. Federal Security Agency, Social
Security Board, 70 F Supp. 758 (N. J. 1947), discussed in 15 U. OF Cm. L. REv.
220, and also 33 VA. L. REv. 771.
" Bergeron v. Bergeron, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1934) 1805, discussed in 14 BOSTON
U. L. RFv. 826.
See Ruiz, The Effect of Section 1915 of the Code of Civil Procedure on
Migratory Divorces Procured in Forezgn Countries, 13 So. CALIF. L. REv. 294.
Estate of Hensgen, 80 Adv. Cal. App. 88, 181 Pac. (2d) 69 (1947), discussed in
21 So. CALIF. L. REv. 201-mail-order divorce held void.
r' Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E. (2d) 845 (1940), discussed in
16 CiN. L. Bnv. 257
Carman v. Garman, 102 Fed. (2d) 272, 122 A. L. R. 1317 (App. D. C.
1939), discussed in 13 So. CALIF. L. Rv. 520.
' Miller v. Miller, -- Miss. -- 159 S. 112 (1935), discussed in 8 Miss. L. J.
'397-408.
"' Langewald v. Langewald, 234 Mass. 269, discussed in 14 BOSTON U. L.
Rv. 826 at 829.
'Bowditch v. Bowditch, 314 Mass. 410, 50 N.E. (2d) 65, discussed in 24
BOSTON U. L. R-v. 50.
' Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N.E. (2d) 969 (1940), discussed
in Wormser, Injunction Against Prosecution of Divorce Actions In Other States, 9
FonaniLm L. REv. 376, also discussed in 15 ST. JoHNs L. REV. 109, and 8 U. OF
Cm. L. RPv. 141.
Hubschman v. Hubschman, 53 A. (2d) 787, discussed in 2 RrrGFns L.
REv. 160.
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New York decisions on the validity of quickie divorces may out-
number those of the remainder of the States combined. This is due
to three factors-the great population of New York State, the concen-
tration of wealth among its inhabitants, the rigidity of its own divorce
laws. A volume could be written on the New York law with respect
to the recognition of foreign divorce decrees. The subject has been
a favorite one with the writers in legal periodicals, particularly those
published by law schools located in that state.85 In a large number
of cases the principle of estoppel has been applied by the courts of
New York80 and also those of other S7 States to uphold the validity of
foreign decrees. With respect to the problem of enjoining foreign
divorce suits, the New York Court of Appeals has gone in one direc-
tion while the lower New York Courts, relying on Williams I, have
gone in a contrary direction. 8 A non-appearing spouse has been held
Note, Recognition of Foreign Divorces in New York, 1 ST. JonNs L. REv.
71. Greene, The Enforcement of a Foreign Divorce Decree rn New York, 11
CORNELL L. Q. 141, with summary at 163. As to New York doctrine of Renvo,
see 35 YALE L. J. 372, and 39 HAIv. L. REv. 640. 10 TuLANE L. REv. 416-425,
also considering the law of England and New Jersey. Howe, The Recognition of
Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York State, 40 CoL. L. 1Ev. 373. Lenhoff,
Attacks on Vulnerable Foreign Divorces: Outposts of Resistance, 21 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 457. Lenhoff, The Rationals of the Recognition of Foreign Divorces in New
York, 16 FoRDHAM L. REv. 231, perhaps the best article of all. Note, Annulments
for Fraud-New York's Answer to Reno? 48 CoLum. L. REv. 900-920. Note, 23
CoLur. L. REv. 469.
See Wheeler, The Effect of Foreign Divorce Upon Dower and Curtsey, 25
MIcH. L. REv. 497 at 503. Glaser v. Glaser (N. Y. 1938), 12 N.E. (2d) 305,
discussed in 22 MINN. L. REv. 880, also discussed in 7 FonsDHm L. EVv. 80, dis-
cussing Davis v. Davis, 59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 52 (1938). Comment, Recogni-
tion of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York, Krause v. Krause, 9 FORDHAM L.
REv. 242, discussing Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N.E. (2d) 290 (1940).
Note, 13.NoTE DAmE LAw 295. Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 118 (the Krause case).
Note, 54 Hnv. L. REv. 1060, discussing Frost v. Frost, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 753
(App. Div. 1st Dept. 1940). Compare, 8 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 343, discussing Mal-
oney v. Maloney, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 334 (S. Ct. 1940). Note, 20 BOSTON U. L. REv.
563 (the Krause case). Note, 10 BROOKLYN L. 1Ev. 198 (the Krause case). Note,
41 MIcH. L. 1Ev. 1201, discussing In re Bingham s Will, 265 App. Div. 463, 39
N. Y. S. (2d) 756 (1943). Note, 44 COLUm. L. REv. 442, discussing the much
cited case of In re Holmes, 291 N. Y. 261, 52 N.E. (2d) 424 (1943), wich went
more on res judicata than on estoppel. Note, 59 HAiv. L. REv. 983, discussing
Shea v. Shea, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 823. (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1946). Note, 16 FORDiAN[
L. REv. 118, discussing Holloway v. Holloway, 187 Misc. 388, 63 N. Y. S. (2d)
915 (Sup. Ct. 1946). Note, Estoppel in Matrimonial Actions-A Survey of the
New York Policy, 14 BROOKLYN L. REv. 254.
'Compare, Brill v. Brill, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 741, 102 P. (2d) 534 (1940),
discussed in 10 FoRDam L. REv. 96. Note, Divorce Estoppel of Second Spouse
to Attack Void Decree, 27 IowA L. REv. 309, discussing Saul v. Saul, 122 F (2d)
64 (App. D. C. 1941). Note, 9 GEORGE WASMNGTON L. REv. 356, discussing
Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F (2d) 753 (App. D. C. 1940). See excellent note,
Public Policy and the Recognition of Questionable Decrees, 21 VA. L. REv. 797.
' Note, 11 MINN. L. REv. 467, commenting on Greenberg v. Greenberg
(1926), 218-App. Div. 104, 218 N. Y. S. 87. Wormser, Injunction Against Prose-
cution of Divorce Actions in Other States, 9 FORDHm L. RV , -376, commenting
on Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N.E. (2d) 969 (1940). Note, 18
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barred by laches from attacking a void divorce decree.8 9 The problem
of the proper method of attack upon the foreign decree is a very
difficult one and several excellent articles have been written on it.90
And now at long last we come to
VI
Conclusion
What is to be done about the sorry mess, the scandal,91 the
tragedy,9 2 that is divorce? Changes93 and reforms, 94 new procedures
and attitudes95 have been suggested. Our ideal should be one of
family stability and solidarity,96 yet the courts make relatively little
effort at reconciliation 97 of the warring spouses. Undoubtedly a
Friend of the Court98 could help along these lines. There is a great
and insistent demand for uniformity in divorce laws,9 9 but the time
is not yet ripe for this development. Diversity of State laws is still
needed to serve as a crucible for testing out various theories, grounds,
defenses and procedures. Such was the opinion of Mr. Justice Bran-
deis, and his view still holds good.
N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 94, New York Doctrine of Estoppel to Contest Invalid Foreign
Divorce Decrees, discussing the Goldstein case incidentally. Note, 11 FoRDHAm
L. REv. 95, discussing Wiedlich v. Wiedlich, 80 N. Y. S. (2d) 326 (1941) (a case
of novel impression involving malicious prosecution), incidentally discussing the
Goldstein case. Note, 40 CoLuir. L. REV. 1255, discussing the Goldstein case at
length. Note, 16 FORDHLAM L. REV. 288, discussing Pereira v. Pereira, 70 N. Y. S.
(2d) 763 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1947). Compare, 22 ST. JoHNs L. REV. 152, dis-
cussing Gaskell v. Gaskell, 189 Misc. 504, 72 N. Y. S. (2d) 440 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
Note, 47 COLUm. L. REv. 1236, Injunction of Foreign Divorce Proceedings, dis-
cussing the Pereira case. Excellent note, 18 BRooKLr,, L. REv. 148, Injunctions
Against Foreign Suits-A Survey of the New York in the Inter-State Matnmonal
Litigation.
' 83 LOWA L. REV. 738, commenting on Swift v. Swift, 29 N.W 2d 535
(Iowa 1947)-no problem of the interstate divorce involved.
' Note, 43HARV. L. REV 477, Methods of Attacking Invalid Foreign Divorces.
Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 34 MicH. L. REV. 749, 959, the leading
article. Lenhoff, Attacks of Vulnerable Foreign Divorces: Outposts of Resistance,
21 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 457.
' Divorce Laws: Remedies for Abuses and Scandals Are Sought, 34 A. B. A.
JoXM. 195.
'The National Tragedy of Divorce, 30 J. AM . JUD. Soc. 180.
' Sayre, Divorce by judicial Process, 18 IowA L. REv. 493.
17 GEORGE WASHINGTON L. REv. 380.
' See an excellent article in 32 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 38.
Ruiz, The Instability of the Family: A Juridical Diagnosis, 4 NOTRE DANIiE
LAw 79.
' Compare Brumm, Some Thoughts on the Great Problem of Divorce, 2 Miss.
L. Joui. 271. When the Illinois Legislature set up reconciliation machinery in the
1947 Domestic Relations Act, the Illinois Supreme Court promptly held the Act
unconstitutional. See 15 U. OF CIII. L. REV. 770, commenting on Hunt v. Cook
County, 398 M. 412, 76 N.E. 2d. 48 (1947).
' Pokorny, "Friend of the Court" Aids Detroit Judges in Divorce Cases, 29
J. Am. JuD. Soc. 166.
' See Part III of this Article, Supra.
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In modesty and with some hesitation, the writer offers the follow-
ing suggestions for the betterment of the law of marriage and divorce.
In offering these suggested reforms and changes the writer is en-
deavoring to get away from a purely mechanical approach to the
problem and he hopes he may strike pay dirt in some of his ideas
even though others may not meet with the approval of the profession.
It is respectfully submitted that the following ideas are true, sound
and practical:
(1) The Home, not the institution, is the hope of society and
therein lies our salvation.
(2) Marriage should be encouraged by levying a flat tax on all
bachelors above the age of thirty
(3) All childless couples who have been married ten years and
have a net income of $5,000 a year, should be required to adopt one
or more children.
(4) In view of the modem economic independent status of women,
alimony payments should be lessened.
(5) There should be no divorce allowed during the first five years
of marriage. Separation might be allowed during this period for
adultery and/or physical cruelty
(6) No divorce should be allowed while the youngest child is un-
der the age of ten.
(7) Subject to tfhe foregoing limitations divorce should be allowed
by mutual consent. To this end some States should enact statutes
making mutual consent a ground for divorce. Thus these States would
constitute themselves Brandeis laboratories for the conducting of
social experiments in this field.
(8) All children who are mature enough to be competent witnesses
should be allowed to testify in contested divorce cases involving their
parents and the testimony of the children should be accorded great
weight, for they are in the best position to observe and they are liable
to become the chief victims if a divorce is granted and thereby their
home is lost to them forever.
(9) The defense of recrimination is on the way out and should
swiftly go the way of all flesh.
(10) the defense of collusion should also be knocked into the
proverbial cocked hat into which Woodrow Wilson once said he
would like to knock William Jennings Bryan (see a letter from Wilson
to Colonel George Harvey). In this manner some of the hypocrisy
would be let out of the divorce balloon.
(11) the defense of condonation is rather feeble under modem
divorce practice but this defense and the sister one of connivance are
not yet completely socially out-moded.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
(12) Is a finding of fault 00 necessary? In any event is it socially
desirable? The answer is obvious-there is no such thing as a divorce
suit in which only one party is at fault. It follows that we must get
away from the practice of placing all the blame on one party
(13) Closely connected with the problem of fault is that of two-
party litigation. Some more scientific method of approach, some bet-
ter form of social therapy must be devised. It is certain that two-
party litigation is not a perfect way to solve marital difficulties.
And now we oldersters, the generation which grew up under
Haddock v Haddock, and who were soldiers, sailors and marines in
World War I, have seen our children mature under Williams v North
Carolina, have seen them go off gaily to World War II, have seen
some of them return, have given our daughters (the new Mistress
Lady) to'a new generation of Sir Knights, have seen them embark on
the new Ship, Domestic Felicity, and now we see them sailing out
of the harbor into the open seas. May they cling to one another in
temptest and sunshine, in clear and stormy weather, in joy and sor-
row, in success and failure. May the storms subside, may the fog
lift, may the rocks be washed away, may the Ship remain seaworthy,
may they sail triumphantly in the end, into Sailors Snug Harbor.
And there may they have rabbits and everything. May they live on
the fat of the land. May theirs be the Victory forever and ever.
BASIL HUBBARD POLLIT
" See Silving, Divorce Without Fault, 29 IowA L. REv. 527.
